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SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION C.OMPANY, a corporation,
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,
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'

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Salt Lake Transportation Company, a corporation
with nontransferable franchises from the Utah Public Service
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and Salt Lake
City to operate taxicabs known as Yellow Cabs in Salt Lake
City aHd surrounding areas, submitted its first quarter unemployment compensation contribution report showing thereon
that no wages were reported for its drivers for the month of
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March. A representative of the Department of Employment
Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah investigated
and on June 16, 195 5, determined that the company should
have reported ((wages" of the drivers and made an order to
that effect (R 14). The company appealed to the Appeals
Referee and a hearing was held and a decision rendered on
September 2, 195 5 (R 44.) The company appealed to the
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah within
the time prescribed by law and the said Board affirmed the
decision of the Appeals Referee (R 53.) The company then
appealed to this Court within the time and in the manner prescribed by law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For a number of years the Salt Lake Transportation Company, operator of Yellow Cabs in Salt Lake City and surrounding areas, owned and operated taxicabs, employed drivers on
a commission basis to operate its cabs, and paid unemployment
compensation taxes on such wages. On March 1, 195 5, the
company entered into an arrangement with its drivers whereby
the drivers paid a daily rental for the cabs (R 10, 21, 22).
Except for the daily rental, the drivers retained all monies
collected from passengers carried without any accounting
therefor to the company (R 26) except that the driver was
required at the end of each shift to turn in a otrip sheet"
(R 26) showing, among other things, the total mileage traveled
during the shift. The trip sheet did not carry an indication
of the passengers carried or the money collected therefor.
4
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In addition to the montes received directly frorn the
passengers, the drivers are paid directly by the company a commission on the sale of sight-seeing tickets, which amounts to
10% of the sight-seeing fare (R 37). Also the company sells
coupon books to the general public, and when a driver receives
coupons in payment of fares, he turns the coupons into the
company at face value for cash {R 37).
The drivers furnish their own gasoline, which they can
obtain from the company at a discount, and in addition are
responsible for damage to cabs up to $50.00 (damage which
is due to the driver's own negligence) (R 10, 11). The company provides a garage, makes all repairs on taxicabs, keeps
the cabs in proper running order including greasing and lubrication, maintains taxicab stands, assigns the drivers to certain
shifts (R 23), furnishes a telephone and radio dispatching
service, provides training for new drivers, and carries public
liability insurance, the effect of which is to hold the· drivers
harmless for $5,000 to $10,000 public liability, and in addition
the company maintains $5,000 propery damage insurance (R 10,
13, and 22).
Each driver is furnished a 26-page booklet outlining in
detail the driver's responsibility in representing the o~ganization
in his contacts with the public, his care of the equipment, use
and sale of coupon books, commission sales of sight-seeing
tickets, etc. (R 18).
The company has a right to terminate the so-called lease
agreements at any time at the end of any shift when no violation
has occurred or during any shift when the driver has violated
operating rules applicable to the drivers of taxicabs · (R 30) .

5
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The Utah EmployJ.?ent Security Act provides:
cc35-4-22 (j) (1) (Erpployment' means any service
performed prior to January 1, 1941, which was employment as defined· in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law prior to the effective date of this act,
and subject to the other provisions of this subsection,
. service performed after December 31, 1940, including
service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer
of a corporation performed for wages or under any contract of hire written or oral, express or implied."
((35-4-2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of hire, written
or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act unless· and until it is shown
to the satisfaction of the Commission that-

( A) such individual has been and will continue to
be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of hire and in fact; and
(B) such service is either outside the usual course
of the business for which such service is performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as
that involved in the contract of service."
({35-4-22 (p) (Wages' means all remuneration for
personal services, including commissions and bonuses
and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium
other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an
individual in the course of his employment from per6
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sons other than his employing .uhit !shall be treated as
wages received from his. employing unit. The reasonable cash value of remuneration in any medium other
than cash and the reasonable amount .of gratuities
shall be estimated and. determined in accordance with
rules pr~scribed by the Commission; provided 7 that the
term ~wages' shall not in\luqe:"
~ ~ 3 5-4-10

( i) . . .' . In any judicial proceeding under
this section the findings of the Commission and the
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evidence
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said court
shall be confined to questions of law . . . . ''
This Court has many times determined that employment,
as it is used in the Act, is to be determined by the statutory rules
alone and not by any common law definition of master and
servant. In this case we are concerned with two questions:
(a) Did the taxicab drivers perform services for the Salt Lake
Transportation Company and (b) were such services performed
for wages?

STATEMENT OF POINTS.
POINT I
THE TAXI DRIVERS DID PERFORM· PERSONAL
SERVICES FOR THE PLAINTIFF COMPANY.

POINT. II
THE DRIVERS PERFORMED SUCH SERVICES FOR
. WAGES.
,

;•

'

I

'

-

'
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TAXI DRIVERS DID PERFORM PERSONAL
SERVICES FOR THE PLAINTIFF COMPANY.
The decision of the Referee that the taxi drivers were
performing personal services for the plaintiff company is supported by the evidence.
In examining any given situation to determine the relationship of the parties as to whether such relationship falls
within the scope of the statutory provisions, we are compelled
to look beyond the name designation of the relationship to
its factual substance. The Employment Security Act does not
specifically define the term ((service." However, this Court
in a number of cases has interpreted its meaning in the light
of the statutory language. In the case of Creameries of
America, Inc. vs. the Industrial Commission of Utah and
Robert L. Foss, 98 Utah 571, 102 P 2d 3{)0, Justice McDonough
discussed the application of the statutory language to the term
(Csetvice" at some length. In that case the facts were substantially as follows:
Creameries of America, Inc., entered into a contract called
a !(Franchise Agreement" with the defendant Foss, who \Yas
denominated ndealer" therein, under which contract there was
granted to Foss the exclusive right to sell the company's products at retail in a defined franchise area in Salt Lake City.
Under the contract the company agreed to sell such products
to Foss at a price fixed at a discount from nthe retail price
posted on the Company's bulletin board," or if no price \vas
8
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posted, then at a nreasonable price as determined by the company for similar products in the same neighborhood.'' The
company loaned to the dealer a list of names, addresses, and
requirements of the persons who at the date of the contract
were purchasing its products at retail within the franchise area.
The company reserved to itself the good will of the retail
trade within the area, a provision being made by the agreement
for the (lpurcfiase" from the dealer, upon the termination of
the contract, of any customers or business acquired by the
latter during the life of the contract· after deducting any loss
thereof suffered during such period. The contract term was
for one year and ttthereafter from year to year, unless otherwise
cancelled or terminated.'' The agreement was terminable by
either party upon giving the other two weeks' written notice.
The dealer agreed not to handle products other than those of
the company within the area. Upon the dealer's failure to carry
out any of the provisions of the contract, the company reserved
the right to terminate the agreement upon twenty-four hours'
written notice thereof. The agreement was not assignable without the written consent of the company.
Foss was required to keep his truck at the company's
garage and repairs were made thereon by the company and
charged to the claimant without his knowledge or consent.
Books of account were supposed to be kept by claimant, which
books were required to be left at the offices of the company
unless consent was obtained to ·take them home. The company
maintained a special bank account for claimant and deposited
the money collected from customers. The company made nsuggestions" and noffered advice" as to how claimant should
increase sales, make collections, etc.

9
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Justice McDonough, in discussing the meaning of the term
((service" as used_ in the Employment Security Act, stated:
. " ((Section 19 (p) defines (wages' as (all remuneration
payable for personal services, including commissions
and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration ·payable in any medium other than cash.' The term (services' and (personal service' used in defining (wages'
are not specifically defined in the Act. In ordinary
usage· the term (services' has a· rather broad and general
meaning. It includes generally any act performed for
the benefit of another under some arrangement or
agreement whereby such act was to have been performed. The general definition of (service' as given in
Webster's New International Dictionary is (performance of labor for the benefit of another'; (Act or instance of helping, or benefiting'. The term (personal
service' indicates that the (act' done for the benefit of
another is done personally by a particular individual.
(Services' then must be given the broader
meaning hereinabove adverted to. No indication is
given in the Act that the legislature intended to give a
restricted meaning to such term. On the contrary the
way in which (services' or (personal services' appears
in our Unemployment Compensation Act indicates an
intention on the part of the legislature to use the term
in its broad general sense. If such personal services
are found to have been performed for the employing
unit, then such service is to be deemed employment
subject to the Act. But if the facts required by subdivisions (a) (b) and (c) of subsection ( j) ( 5) are
shown to the satisfaction of the commission, the service
of the individual is not within the terms of the Act;
otherwise it is. We turn now to a consideration of the
evidence in this case.
cc

••••

nit is clear that Foss was performing services for the
plaintiff. Although by his contract Foss was supposedly
10
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(buying' dairy products from plaintiff and (reselling' to
certain customers, still the · purchasers of the dairy
products were customers of the company and not of
the distributor. The customers were receiving plaintiff's
products through the (distributor.' The plaintiff never
relinquished its right to those customers, and at the
termination of a contract with a distributor the company had a right not only to a list of all old Ct1Stomers
so that it could continue to supply its products. to them
through some other distributor, it also had the right
to purchase for one dollar each the names of any new
customers obtained by the distributor during his contract with the company. The dealer could acquire no
customers for himself; though he was entitled to remuneration for any he might acquire for the employing
unit. Certainly the distribution or (reselling' of plaintiff's dairy products to plaintiff's customers was performing (services' for plaintiff within the meaning of
the Act."
Justice McDonough concluded that:
((While there is dispute in the evidence as to some of
the above facts, the evidence in the record clearly discloses that the commission might reasonably have
found that the claimant was not free from (control' and
(supervis~on' under his contract with the plaintiff and
in fact."
Chief Justice Wolfe in the case of H. L. and Irene Leach,
dba, Rusco Window Company vs. Board .of Revie:w of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of E~ployment
Security, 260 P 2d 744, in his discussion as to whether or not
certain dealers arid installers for the plaintiff were rendering
services for the plaintiff, referred to Justice McDonough's
comments in the ~reameries of America, Inc., case~ supra, with
approved arid said:
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ccwe find in the record competent evidence from
which the Board of Review could have reasonably concluded that both the dealers and the installers were
rendering services for the plaintiffs for cwages' as that
term is defined in theAct. This court held in Creameries
of America, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 571,
102 P. 2d 300, that the word cservices' while not defined in the Act, should be given a broad meaning. Said
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice McDonough,
Cin ordinary usage the term ccservices" has a rather
broad and general meaning. It includes generally any
act performed for the benefit of another under some
arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to
have been performed.' We further stated that all remuneration payable for personal services is (wages.' "
In the matter of Singer Sewing Machine Company vs.
the Industrial Commission of Utah et al, 104 Utah 175, 134
P. 2d 479, this Court laid down a number of rules to which
the Court was committed in a_pplying the statutory provisions
of the Utah Employment Security Act, and we quote:
c(The examination of these opinions reveals that the
members of this court are committed to the following:
(a) The unemployment compensation law was enacted under and as an exercise of the police power of
the state.
(b) Its purpose is remedial to protect the health,
morals, and welfare of the people by providing a cushion against the shocks and rigors of unemployment.
(c) Being remedial under the police power and not
imposing limitations on basic rights, it should be liberally construed.
(d) 'Employment' under the act is not confined to
common law concepts, or to the relationship of master
12
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and servant, but is expanded to embrace all ser·vtces
rendered for another for wages.
(e) The terms (employment', (personal services' and
(wages' are much broader in meaning and application
than their common law counterparts, and encompass in
their coverage many persons and relationships not included in the common law relationship of master and
servant.
(f) All situations where one rendering services for
another for (wages' is under the direction and control
of such other in the rendering of such service, are
service relationships within Sec. 19 (j) ( 1) of the act.
(g) The absence of direction and control does not
necessarily exclude the parties, or the relationship from
the operations or scope of the act.
(h) In determining if the relationship is within the
act, the Commission and the court will look behind
the contract to the· actual situation-the status in which
the parties are placed by the relationship that exists
between them.
( i) The test is twofold: Did he render personal
service for another? If so, was he entitled to remuneration (wages) therefor? If both are found, the relationship is within the act.

(j) If the relationship is. within the act, we apply
Section 19 (j) ( 5) to determine if he is entitled to
benefits, provided the claimant meets all other requirements of the act to bring him within its provisions.
(k) Section 19 (j) (5) is an exception or exclusion
section taking or sifting out from the right to receive
benefits, certain persons who otherwise come within
the act, as (rendering personal services for wages' and
is not a test to determine whether the relationship was
. one. ''
a serv1ce

13
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A(ter discussing the relationship. between the Singer Sewing Machine Company and Gorman·· C. Winget, the Court
concluded::·.
(<Each of the above terms are inconsistent with the
concept . of a vendor.:vendee relationship. The business
shows it was the Company's goods, the Company's accounts; the Company's risks of profit and loss; the
Company's money; the Company's customers; the Company's good will; the Company's salesman. Many of
the services ·rendered by the salesman were rendered
at the specific direction of, and for the Company. It was
a service relationship."
While Justice Wolfe in the case of Fuller Brush Company vs. the Industrial Commission of Utah et al, 99 Utah 97,
104 P. 2d 201, dissented, we think his discussion of the issues.
and facts to be considered in determining whether or not a
service relationship exists, reflects th~ thinking of the rna jority
of the Court and we quote:
((But any services for (wages', as (wages' is defined
by Sec. 19 (p), however small, constitutes a service
relationship as distinguished from a non-service relationship. However, it must be a service relationship and
it must be services performed for wages. A true vendorvendee or a lessee-lessor relationship are not service
relationships. They fall in the non-service category. Not.
the only test of a vendor-vendee or lessor-lessee relationship is the contract executed betw~en the· parties.
This may in words and fornz meet the tests of a vendorvendee contract rather than a service contract, but
facts aliunde of the contract may be taken into consideration to determine the real relationship between
the parties. And this relationship for purposes ~f determining whether the applicant may participate in
· the Fund and whether the other party to the -relation.;

14
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ship was· an 'employer'· of the applicarit, must be
viewed in connection with the Act and the purposes
which it is to serve. This is not to say that what is
not a service relationship under tests applicable, had
this Act never been passed, will become a service relationship because of the Act. What is meant to be said
is that the Commission and this Court will look behind
the mere form of the relationship to determine what
it actually is and not what it is called. If the .relationship was to all intents and purposes one for the rendering of services by one party to another, the fact
that it may assume the legal habiliments of another
type of contract will not avail to defeat the applicant's
right to share in the Fund. This I understand to be
the real meaning of National Tunnel & Mines v. Ind.
Com., supra. The Act was meant to cushion unempfoyment treated as an incident to the service relationship
of employment. This objective was not only for the
welfare of the individual entitled, but for the benefit
of society. The individual needing work is in most cases
required to contract in the manner which ·he vvho has
the job to offer may desire. And if the net result of
that contract is to provide what would ordinarily be
a service performed for him, it will be lo{)ked at in
fact as indeed it is-as creating a service relationship.
Under an agreement of 'employment' which
the Company can terminate at will, a (suggestion' or
'some advice' from a supervisor over a territory in all
probabili~y constitutes, in effect, an order to a (dealer'
·who wishes to keep his -territory and to continue to
sell Fuller brushes. It is also noteworthy that ,the sales
organization acknowledgingly extended ·down to the
last ljnk, including · the consumer_ and .. the plaintiffthat is, the so-called 'dealer'."
'C • • • •

Keeping in mind the· reasoning in the above quoted cases,
let us examine the situation in the instant case. In· our dis-

15
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cussion, we would like to make it plain that we ·do not consider
that the acts of the company in changing its method of operation
were taken with the intent to evade unemployment compensation taxes. The company representative testified (R 21) that
the company for some time prior to March 1, 1955, had been
attempting to obtain an arrangement with Salt Lake City
whereby taxicab meters would be used with the apparent idea
that the use thereof would lead to an increase in revenue for
both the drivers and company. On being convinced that the
use of the meters was not going to come into existence, the
company decided, after consultation with the unions and the
employees, to change their method of operations to one whereby
the ((driver" ((leased" his taxicab from the company at a
certain price per shift. The company representative testified
( R21) : ((The Company was losing money under the commission and guarantee basis operation and the drivers were making
comparatively small earnings as represented by their take-home
checks. And it appeared to us that with the institll:tion of the
lease method of operation where the driver pays for the gasoline factor of expenses and was entirely on his own as to the
control of his unit on the street that he would do better and
that the company's operating cost would be less."
On March 1, employees who formerly were working on a
commission guarantee basis commenced Hleasing" their taxicabs
on a shift basis.
For the purpose of better illustrating the situation, let us
examine the series of events under which a new inexperienced
driver enters into his relationship with the company and how
he operates thereafter.

16
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In the first place a new driver is, in all probability, obtained by newspaper or word-of-mouth advertising. He more
often than not is regularly employed at places other thati the
Yellow Cab Company (R 24). He may be a University student,
a school teacher, a shift worker at one of the smelters, a postman, or he may have a different occupation. Generally, he is
an ordinary working man who wishes to increase his other
income. He meets with the company's ((superintendent of
taxicabs" and he agrees to ((lease" a cab. He obtains no interest
in the company's franchise to operate a taxicab business, which
franchise, is, of course, nontransferable (R 21). He is told
that it will be necessary for him to obtain his own individual
licenses, which are required by the state and the city. This
he does at his own expense. He deposits $15.00 with the company to insure payment on his daily use of a taxicab, which
cab, incidentally, is not specifically designated in his contract
He is then assigned to a company employee who takes him
on a student training trip (R 28 and 34). On this trip he is
indoctrinated as to the best methods of operating a taxicab,
keeping in mind the public interests. He is advised as to the
use and care of the shortwave radio which is in his cab. He
is informed as to the various taxi stands and the use of the
telephone.
He is given a t•Yellow Cab Drivers Guide," (R 18) which
starts out on Page 1: (CTo the public you ARE the Yellow Cab.
You must assume the responsibility of representing the entire
organization in your contacts with the public-pedes~rians and
motorists as well as your patrons. It is your aim to have this
organization take its rightful place among the mo~t reliable
and responsible businesses in the community ,and the success
17
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of this a.tm rests largely with you . · . . In entering into a
contract- \vith- this company it is taken for granted_ that· you
are anxious and willing to cooperate with other Y ~How Cab
driver~: in rendering the best possible service to Yellow Cab
customers." (This last sentence appears in italics.) (Incidentally, thi$ Driver's Guide was revised effective ··March 1,
1955.) _(Italics ours).
The introductory statement then informs the driver that
special privileges will be granted to none and ~at the driver
should operate in a manner which will continue to be a credit
to himself and to nthis organization." The Guide -then continues to give _((advice'' to the driver as to what the customer
expects. It then goes on to deal with Special Orders; Starters
and Dispatchers; Quarreling; Notification; Loading and Unloading Passengers; Handling of Complaints; Reporting for
the Shifts; Shift Rules, including a statement that ot1ertime
will not be allowed unless previously permitted by the office
and that drivers will be given regular days oif; Storms; Handling of Baggage; Handling of -Change; Waiting for Customers; Questionable Loads; Passengers "'ho Refuse to Pay;
Articles Left in Cab; Soliciting or Influencing Patrons; Drinking~ the Law; Suggested Conduct; Appearance; Change of
Address; Drivers~ Meetings; Reading the Bulletin Board;
Drivers' Equipment;- Coupon Books-in connection with these
books,; it is explained to the drivers that the company sells
coupon books,· a $5.00 book costing $4.50; Reports; Responsibility; Mechanical Trouble. Then there follows a detailed
statement of what is expected of the driver in taking care
of his ·equipfl'lent, how· he shall ·drive, how he shall ·report18.
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accidents, how to operate when empty, and so on covering the
entire field of service to the general public which is embodied
in the issuance of the.franchise to the company.
The Guide explains to the driver that the driver may sell
sight-seeing tours, upon which he will be paid a commission
of 10%. It instructs him in the procedures of reporting a sale
and obtaining the 10% commission from the company. The
Guide ends with the statement: ((In our company, we have
always been able to feel pride in the moral caliber of our
drivers. Through drivers such as yourselves, the standing of
the taxicab has been recognized to be one of constructive
citizenship." (Italics ours).
The driver is then informed that he must file a trip sheet
(R 10) on forms which are supplied by the company. The
superintendent of cabs then assigns the driver to a certain shift
and designates his days off. Each day when he reports for work
he is required tq accept the one taxicab (of the company's 88
cabs) which is on that day assigned to him. He can now continue to drive a taxicab keeping all monies collected from the
customers, except that which he spends for gasoline and payment of his shift, and he can so continue until such time as
he violates a rule applicable to cab drivers or until such time
as his conduct while driving does not conform to the ((advice"
which he has been given. Upon any violation the company
is free to terminate his services at will and to either take the
taxicab away .. from him during his shift (R 30 and 31) or
refuse .him the right to "lease" a cab.
Whenever the company informs him by radio that he is
to «(report to garage" he is required to do so as soon as possible.
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The contract specifically requires that the driver personally
drive the cab and that he permit no other person than ·himself
to do so. In this connection we would like again to refer to
the language of Justice McDonough in Creameries of America,
Inc., supra, in which he states:
((The term 'personal service' indicates that the 'act'
done for the benefit of another is done personally by
a particular individual."
We would again like to quote in part from Justice Wolfe's
comments in the Fuller Brush Company Case, supra:
((The Act was meant to cushion unemployment
treated as an incident to the service relationship of
employment. This objective was not only for the welfare of the individual entitled, but for the benefit of
society. The individual needing work is in most cases
required to contract in the manner whic_h he who has
the job to offer may desire. And if the net result of
that contract is to provide what would ordinarily be
a service perfonned for him, it will be looked at in
fact as indeed it is-as creating a service relationship."
(Italics ours.)
We submit that the entering into the contract for the
"leasing" of a taxicab was only the beginning (rather than
the end result) of a service relationship, the result of which
is the fulfillment of the conditions of service to the public
under which the company obtained its franchise to operate as
a public service business.
After the driver is given very detailed advice as to how
he is to operate and perfor1JJ under his contract in order to
maintain the con1pany standards of operation, statements that
the con1pany could not require him to do those things carry
20
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very little meaning in the light of the overall factual situation.
A driver in his own mind is well aware of the fact that because
the company can terminate his relationship at will, the com.pany can, in fact, compel him through its nadvice" to do all
of those things which are necessary in the proper performance
of driving a taxicab and furnishing cab service to the public.
Of course he is going to perform in the manner suggested
by the company because he knows that unless he does, his
earnings are going to cease.
The company representative testified that they could not
require the driver to accept calls. This must be examined in
the light of subsequent testimony that in order to continue its
franchise for the operation of taxicabs, it is actually necessary
to perform the public service for which the franchise was given.
Since the driver's use of the cab is restricted to the driving
of the public for fares, the driver is certainly impelled (if he
is going to obtain anything from the arrangement) to accept
fares which he picks up himself and which he picks up as a
result of telephone and r_adio communication from the company office. The relationship between the company and the
driver is entirely inconsistent with that of lessor-lessee or
bailor-bailee. The driver is not subjected to the risks of profit
and loss as those terms are generally known. His earnings are
dictated by the amount of nfares" which he carries and the
money obtained therefor and his costs are fixed and not variable.
The customers, the risks of profit and loss, .the good will, the
property, the franchise, the responsibility to the public for
injuries, and for taxi service are those of the company and
not of the driver.
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Counsel for plaintiff has referred to some extent to cases
decided by the Federal Courts with reference to the subject
of unetnployment cotnpensation coverage. In the case of
United States vs. Silk, 331 U.S. at Page 712, 67 S. Ct. at Page
l467, the Court said:
((As the Federal Social Security legislation is an attack
on recognized evils in our national economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would
not comport with its purpose. Such an interpretation
would only make for a continuance to a considerable degree of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised
and would invite adroit schemes by some employers and
employees to a void the immediate burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation."
And in ~aus vs~ Huston (Iowa) 35 F. Supp. 327, wherein the
facts are substantially the same as in the instant case, the Court
said:
((Does the plaintiff engage merely in the leasing of
taxicabs or as a common carrier of passengers? When
all factors are considered, and particularly the contractual relationship of the plaintiff with the passengers carried, I think there c:an be little doubt that
plaintiff is operating the line of taxic_abs, and that
while he h-as adopted an ingenious method of ·fixing
the compensation of his drivers and permits the drivers
to exercise some discretion over the cab during the
period of the driver's shift, nevertheless I think there
is no discretion vested in the drivers inconsistent \Yith
the relation of master and servant. From the very
nature of the case the drivers, in order to perform their
duties promptly, must exer_cise very complete control
over the cabs \vhile they have them on their shifts.'.'
It \vilL of course, be noted that the language- of the Social
Security Act defines coverage within the limits of the master-
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servant rule. We would like to point out that the Federal
courts, prior to the convening of the 80th Congress, had n1ore
and more been inclined to expand the coverage under the
Social Security Act thereby including many individuals \vho
would not normally be included under the employer-employee,
master-servant rule. As a result of this continued expansion
by the courts, the Congress apparently did not agree \Vith
the courts' expansion of coverage and considered it a usurpation of congressional legislative function and consequently
the 80th Congress, in its second session, amended the Social
Security Act, over the President's veto, and specifically limited
the coverage definition to the common law rule of ((employeremployee." (Public Law 642, 80th Congress, Second Session,
Amending Paragraph 1101 (a) ( 6) Social Security Act.) (Sec.
10 A.L.R. 2d 358.) It is to be expected, therefore, that cases
which came before the Federal courts after that action by the·
80th Congress would consider the coverage question in the
light of the restricted language adopted by the Congress.
Since the Utah statufe, as has been many times previously
construed, intends a much broader coverage than that of the
common law rule of master-servant or employer-employee,
we think the federal cases (dealing only with the masterservant rule) carry very little weight in the instant case. We,
the respondents, are of the view that the circumstances which
indicate that the taxi drivers in this case are performing
services tcin employment" outweigh those which may indicate
otherwise. The Salt Lake Transportation Company owns the
taxicabs and the necessary operating franchises. lt'has a garage
where those cabs are housed and serviced, except for gasoline
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which is paid for by the drivers. It is listed in the telephone
directory as offering taxicabs for hire, and it employs telephone
and shortwave radio operators to receive calls for taxicab
service. The drivers have no investment in equipment and no
separate business apart from operating the plaintiff's taxicabs.
They are required to operate their cabs during specified periods
and on a day to day basis. Periodically the company advises
the drivers by printed material and otherwise regarding such
subjects as safe driving, drinking on duty, how to avoid accidents, what to do in case of accidents, what to do with articles
left in cabs by passengers, etc. If a driver disobeys any of
these company rules or regulations, the company can refuse
to permit him to take out or operate a taxicab.
These circumstances would appear to be the determinative
factors indicating that these drivers are performing services
in employment. The business of the company is the operation
of taxicabs for hire. The drivers' jobs are an integral part of
that business and not an incident to it. The unlimited right
of the company to terminate the services of the driver and the
right of the company to control these drivers as to the hours
they shall work is sufficient to show an employment relationship \Vithin the n1eaning of the Act.
In addition to the ((leasing" of taxicabs, the drivers are
asked to act as company representatives in selling sight-seeing
tours on the Gray Line busses. For this sales activity the drivers
are paid in cash by the company a ten per cent commissiona very definite indication that this is a service relationship.
While the appellants point out that there are no wages
going fron1 the company to the drivers, we respectfully call
24
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the court's attention to the fact that the company sells coupon
books and that the drivers accept coupons in payment of
fares. After accepting such coupons, the drivers then cash
them in at the company's office thereby receiving 'compensation for the fare. The appellants indicate that the Departtnent
of Employment Security would be in a difficult position should
the ((driver-lessee" be considered within the Act. In reply, we
would like to point out that the application of the benefit
provisions of the Act to the (!driver-lessee" would be no different than in the case of individuals working by the hour.
Any employee has a right to refuse to accept a job when he
finds that the wage level of the job is not sufficient to satisfy
him. He also has a right to refuse a job when he considers
that the working conditions are not to his standards or liking.
This is equally true in regards to the (!drivers". The Department would, of course, look into the situation to see whether
or not the claimant's unemployment was due to the company's
refusal to sign a rental agreement or whether or not it was
due to the claimant's refusal to accept the rental agreement or
to his having committed some misconduct in connection with
his work.
We submit that the relationship between the Salt Lake
Transportation Company and its drivers was one of service
within the definition of service laid down by this Court in
numerous other cases.
POINT II
THE DRIVERS PERFORMED SUCH SERVICES FOR
WAGES.
The monies received by the driver from passengers as
25
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fares (less the amount paid, for the daily shift for the cab
and the. gasoline cost), the commissions received from the sale
of sightseeing tours, and the monies received from the company in return for coupons collected from passengers for
fares :were all wages within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act and Section 35-4-22 (p) supra.
In the Creameries of America, Inc., case, supra, the Court
discussed the meaning of the word c (wages'' and said:
''That the income received by Foss from the distribution of products for plaintiff comes within the definition of 'wages' is also evident. All remuneration
payable for personal services is (wages.' We have just
concluded that Foss performed (services' for plaintiff
which. (services' were performed by him personally.
The retnuneration, therefore, which he received for
those 'services~ constituted wages. This remuneration
was the difference between what Foss had to pay the
company for the products and what he "Tas permitted
to charge for such products. He was re<1uired to pay
plaintiff a fixed price for products and the appeal
tribunal might reasonably find from the evidence that
, as a matter of fact the retail sale price \Yas fixed by plaintiff. The difference bet\veen those prices constituted his
'commission.' ''
In the Fuller Brush Company case, supra, the Court discussed the definition of c 'wages'' at some length and said:
.'

'

''But it is not al.l personal service performed for an.other 'that con1es \\·ithin the Act, but only such as is perforn1ed 'for \vages, or under a contract of hire.' 'Wages'
is defined as all compensation payable for personal
services,
rendered for another under a contract of hjre,
'
express or in1plied. This compensation is based upon
and con1puted upon service rendered, and is not derived
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from the accomplishment of a purpose or ach_ievement
of an objective, by the person receiving the remuneration, through a difference in two prices. The essential
elements of wages are that they form a direct obligation against the employer, in favor of the ern,ployee;
that when the service is performed the com2ensation,
if any, accrues and becomes payable regardless of the
success or failure of the undertaking; that any profits
or earning over and above costs of the service accrues
to the en1ployer, and any loss as a result of the undertaking or service must be borne by the em player. It is
essential that the wage move directly franz the enzployer to the enzployee, as tvhere the employee works
on commissions, deducts his cotnmission franz a collection and remits the rnets/ but it is essential that the
remuneration accrues from the product or service of
th·e employer, and would accrue to him except for the
fact that the employee is entitled to t'etain or receiue
it as remuneration under his contract of hire. The terrn
r contract of hire' is not defined in the Act probably
because the legislature felt that the expression u•as so
well established, understood and definite, that it needs
no further amplification or exposition. It is used in its
common meaning and acceptation. It is an aKreement
whereby one undertakes or obligates himself to rendet'
personal service for another for a remuneration to be
paid because the service was rendered, regardless of
the element of profit or loss resulting from the U'ork,
endeavor, or undertaking." (Italics ours.)
We cannot agree that the entire risk of profit and loss from
the operation of the cabs is solely and exclusively that of the
drivers. The driver's sole risk of loss is that during any one
shift he may collect passenger fares in an amount less than his
shift payment and the cost of his gasoline. The primary risk
of profit and loss lies with the company. It is obvious that the
company, in determining t~e amount of monies which were to
27
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be retnitted by the drivers to the company, took into consi~era
tion the company's cost of operating telephone and radio
service, the payment of personnel in handling the company's
business, including supervision and the salary of the super:intendent of taxicabs; the cost of public liability insurance;
the cost of the garage where the taxicabs were housed; the
cost of cab repairs and the cost of any public liability payments
over and above the amount of insurance; and the general upkeep of taxicabs and other equipment.
On the other hand the driver had no investment in equipment or services. If he didn't carry passengers, naturally he
used very little, if any, gasoline.
The success or failure of the undertaking is dependent
not so much upon the ability of the driver to carry a sufficient
number of passengers, but upon the ability of the company to
obtain passengers through its advertising and telephone listings and through the company's ability to keep the drivers
informed as to available passengers. It is true that the driver's
net ren1uneration fluctuates in accordance with the number of
passenger fares he collects just as it is true in the case of the
con1mission salesm~n who furnishes his own car and gasoline
expenses. The commission salesma_n in that case retains as
wages the difference between his costs and the total commissions earned. In the instant case, the Department representative followed the practice which was followed by other jurisdictions, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue. See Michigan Cab Company vs. Kavanaugh, 82 F. Supp. 486. In that
case, on the failure of the company to collect the social security
tax, the Collector of Internal Revenue assigned.._ a deputy
28
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collector to prepare and file a tax return for the plaintiff company. After interviewing three of the plaintiff's drivers and
examining plaintiff's books and records as to the hours worked,
the examiner estimated the average earnings of plaintiff's
drivers to be $6.00 per day. The assessment was then based on
the estimate obtained as a result of the investigation.
In the instant case, the Department representative followed
substantially the same procedures. The appellants argue that
since the drivers are not accountable to the plaintiff for the
fares they collect, then the plaintiff is not in a position to
determine the wages of the drivers so that it can pay the unemployment compensation tax. It occurs to us that the exact
earnings of the drivers might well be obtained by requiring
the drivers to enter the amounts received on the ((trip sheets"
which they are compelled to file with the company.
As to the amounts which are received by the drivers as
commission for the sale of Gray Line tours, the company already has that information. The company is also in possession
of information as to the amounts paid to drivers by the company in redeeming coupons which the drivers receive as fares.
In substance, the instant case falls squarely within the
purview of the decision of this Court in the Creameries of
America, Inc., the Fuller Brush Company, and the Rusco
Window Company cases, all supra.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit that the Appeals Referee reason-
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ably concluded from the evidence in this matter that the drivers
who ((lease" cabs from the Salt Lake Transportation Company
were performing services for wages within the meani~e of the
Utah Employment Security Act.
·
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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